

Message Text

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NEA-06 EB-03 IO-03 /065 W
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R 051330Z FEB 75

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INFO ALL NATO CAPITALS 4958

AMEMBASSY DUBLIN

AMEMBASSY MADRID

AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM

USMISSION EC BRUSSELS

USMISSION GENEVA

USDEL MBFR VIENNA

USNMR SHAPE

USCINCEUR

USLOSACLANT

USDOCOSOUTH

USDEL SALT TWO GENEVA

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 7 USNATO 0619

LIMDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR, NATO

SUBJECT: THE NORTH ATLANTIC ALLIANCE: RETROSPECT AND PROSPECT

GENEVA FOR USDEL CSCE

1974 IN REVIEW

1. THE SETTING.

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AS 1974 BEGAN, THE ATLANTIC ALLIANCE WAS STILL SUFFERING
FROM THE SEVERE SHOCKS THAT HAD JOLTED US-EUROPEAN RELATIONS
DURING 1973. THE MOST EVENT WAS THE OCTOBER MIDDLE
EAST WAR WHICH HAD REVEALED SHARP DIFFERENCES OF INTEREST AND

OPINION. THESE WERE EXACERBATED BY PUBLIC RECRIMINATIONS OVER LACK OF CONSULTATION AND COOPERATION, AND THE "UNANNOUNCED" US TROOP ALERT. SOME ON THE CONTINENT SAW IN THE MIDDLE EAST WAR CONFIRMATION OF THEIR SUSPICIONS THAT US-EUROPEAN RELATIONS HAD UNDERGONE A PROFOUND AND FUNDAMENTAL CHANGE.

AND THERE WERE OTHER EVENTS THAT BUFFETED THE ALLIANCE AND RAISED QUESTIONS ABOUT THE FUTURE OF THE TRANSATLANTIC LINK:

-- THE US-FRENCH CONFRONTATION HIGHLIGHTED BY THE SPIRITED KISSINGER-JOBERT DEBATE OVER THE PREVENTION OF NUCLEAR WAR AGREEMENT.

-- THE STICKY, METAPHYSICAL US-EC 9 TALKS THAT THEN SEEMED UNLIKELY TO YIELD AGREEMENT ON A SUITABLE CONSULTATION MECHANISM.

-- US CHAGRIN THAT THE EUROPEANS HAD FAILED TO RESPOND POSITIVELY OR CREATIVELY TO THE YEAR OF EUROPE MESSAGE; AND A CORRESPONDING SENSE OF SHAME IN SOME ALLIED CAPITALS THAT EUROPE HAD INDEED FAILED.

THERE WERE, IN ADDITION, OTHER FACTORS OF A LESSER ORDER WHICH SOURED RELATIONS AMONG THE ALLIES:

--THE BAD TASTE CREATED BY THE JACKSON-NUNN AMENDMENT WITH ITS THINLY VEILED THREAT TO REDUCE THE AMERICAN TROOP PRESENCE UNLESS THE EUROPEANS MET WASHINGTON'S BALANCE OF PAYMENTS DEMANDS.

-- THE POLITICAL EMBARRASSMENT THAT TWO MEMBERS OF THE ALLIANCE--PORTUGAL AND GREECE--STILL HAD DICTATORIAL REGIMES; AND A MEASURE OF FRUSTRATION THAT MANY OTHERS HAD FLABBY, UNSTABLE, LEADERLESS COALITIONS THAT WERE GOVERNMENTS ONLY IN NAME.

--THE NASTY LITTLE COLD WAR WHICH INVOLVED THREE ALLIES--
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ICELAND AND THE UNITED KINGDOM, AND LATER THE FRT.

AGAINST THIS UNSETTLED BACKGROUND THE ALLIANCE FACED AN UNCERTAIN 1974.

2. 1974 - OVERVIEW: THE GENERAL CLIMATE IN THE ALLIANCE.

1974 DAWNED IN UNCERTAINTY OVERCAST BY A GLOOMY ECONOMIC ENVIRONMENT, GROWING INFLATION AND UNEMPLOYMENT, THE ENERGY CRISIS, BALANCE OF PAYMENTS DIFFICULTIES, AND PROCRASTINATION IN FORGING A COORDINATED WESTERN APPROACH TO THESE PROBLEMS. FURTHER COMPLICATIONS STEMMED FROM LEADERSHIP CHANGES WHICH OCCURRED IN EVERY MAJOR ALLIED GOVERNMENT--INCLUDING THE US-- AND IN MANY OF THE SMALLER

COUNTRIES DURING 1974. THICKENING THIS GLOOM WAS THE CYPRUS CRISIS WHICH LED TWO ALLIES TO THE BRINK OF WAR, TOPPLED THE EXISTING GREEK MILITARY REGIME AND SUBSEQUENTLY CAUSED THE NEW ATHENS GOVERNMENT TO DECIDE TO PULL OUT OF NATO'S INTEGRATED MILITARY STRUCTURE. THE APRIL REVOLUTION IN LISBON OCCASIONED AN INITIAL SIGH OF RELIEF, AND THEN NERVOUS TREMORS AS THE MONTHS WENT BY, FOR NO ONE FELT CERTAIN ABOUT PORTUGAL'S FUTURE ROLE IN THE ALLIANCE.

3. GENERAL ACCOMPLISHMENTS DURING 1974.

DESPITE UNEXPECTED AND UNSTEADYING POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS AND THE HARSH ECONOMIC CLIMATE, THE ALLIANCE WEATHERED 1974 SURPRISINGLY WELL AND MADE PROGRESS IN SEVERAL IMPORTANT AREAS. THESE ADVANCES FLOWED IN LARGE MEASURE FROM THE CONSCIENTIOUS STOCK-TAKING AND THE CANDID CONSULTATIONS THE ULTIMATELY FOUND EXPRESSION THE THE ATLANTIC (OR OTTAWA) DECLARATION, FROM THE JUNE SUMMIT AND FROM THE LEADERSHIP PROVIDED BY CHANCELLOR SCHMIDT AND PRESIDENT GISCARD, WHICH WAS NOTABLY LESS DOGMATIC THAN THAT OF THEIR PREDECESSORS.

-- ATLANTIC DECLARATION:

THE SIGNING OF THE DECLARATION BY NATO HEADS OF GOVERNMENT IN JUNE SYMBOLIZED THE END OF A DIFFICULT PHASE IN TRANSLANTIC RELATIONS AND IT GAVE HOPE FOR THE BEGINNING OF A MORE FRUITFUL PERIOD. THE DECLARATION WAS IMPORTANT IN TWO RESPECTS:

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- IT FORGED ANEW THE LINK BETWEEN US AND EUROPEAN SECURITY, AND RECONFIRMED FUNDAMENTAL ATLANTIC TIES IN OTHER AREAS.

- IT ENLARGED THE FRAMEWORK FOR ALLIANCE POLITICAL CONSULTATIONS, INCLUDING CONSULTATION ON DEVELOPMENTS IN GEOGRAPHIC REGIONS OUTSIDE THE NATO TREATY AREA, AND ON A BROADER RANGE OF NON-MILITARY ISSUES WHICH IMPINGE ON ALLIED COLLECTIVE SECURITY.

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NEA-06 EB-03 IO-03 /065 W

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R 051330Z FEB 75

FM USMISSION NATO

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 9937

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INFO ALL NATO CAPITALS 4959

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LIMDIS

-- 25TH ANNIVERSARY:

THE ATLANTIC DECLARATION, THE VISIBLE CENTERPIECE OF THE ALLIANCE'S 25TH ANNIVERSARY CELEBRATIONS, BROUGHT TOGETHER HEADS OF ALLIED GOVERNMENTS FOR ONLY THE SECOND TIME IN NATO'S HISTORY.

- BOTH THE DECLARATION AND THE ANNIVERSARY CELEBRATIONS SERVED TO FOCUS WORLD ATTENTION ON THE ALLIANCE;

- THESE EVENTS PROVIDED EVIDENCE THAT AFTER A QUARTER CENTURY THE BONDS WHICH UNITE THE ALLIES AND THEIR PEOPLES REMAIN STRONGER
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THAN THE FORCES WHICH DIVIDE THEM, AND THAT ALL FIFTEEN COUNTRIES FELT IT NECESSARY TO AFFIRM THAT THEY STILL NEED EACH OTHER.

-- IMPROVED US-EC DIALOGUE:

BECAUSE OBJECTIVE REALITY REQUIRED IT, AND BECAUSE THE ATLANTIC DECLARATION DRAFTING PROCESS AND THE GOVERNMENTAL CHANGES IN BONN, LONDON AND PARIS FAVORED IT, MORE PRO-DUCTIVE AND SYSTEMATIC MEANS FOR US-EC CONSULTATION WERE AGREED AMONG THE NINE AT GYMNICH -- AND DURING THE REMAINDER OF 1974 THOSE ARRANGEMENTS APPEARED TO HAVE PROVED PRACTICAL AND USEFUL TO BOTH PARTIES.

11 PROGRESS IN EAST-WEST DETENTE:

DURING 1974 PROGRESS ACROSS A BROAD RANGE OF DETENTE

ISSUES CONTINUED AT A HALTING, UNEVEN, UNSPECACULAR
PACE; BUT IT DID CONTINUE AND IT WAS PERCEPTIBLE.

- SALT SAW AT YEAR'S END THE US-SOVIET AGREEMENT AT VLADIVOSTOK
WHICH PROVIDED RESTRAINT THAT WOULD NOT HAVE EXISTED HAD
THE 1972 INTERIM AGREEMENT EXPIRED WITHOUT REPLACEMENT. THAT
AGREEMENT ALSO HELD THE PROMISE OF POSSIBLE REDUCTIONS
IN STRATEGIC ARMS. THE AGREEMENT ITSELF--
AND THE UNITED STATES' CONTINUING EFFORTS TO KEEP ITS
ALLIES ADEQUATELY INFORMED--PROMPTED ALLIED APPLAUSE
AND SOLID, UNQUALIFIED SUPPORT FOR THOSE FEATURES WHICH EXCLUDED
FORWARD-BASED SYSTEMS (FBS) FROM THE US-SOVIET STRATEGIC
EQUATION.

- CSCE: WHILE FORWARD MOVEMENT ON CSCE WAS SLOW AND THE ROAD
BLOCKS AT TIMES EXASPERATING, SIGNS OF POSSIBLE PROGRESS-- IN PART
DUE TO ALLIED COHESION-- EMERGED AT YEAR'S END. WESTERN
COHESION REFLECTED THE CLOSER ALLIANCE CONSULTATION AND COORDINATION
WHICH, IN TURN, WAS PROMPTED BY THE SOVIETS' INTRANSIGENT POSTURE
DURING MUCH OF THE YEAR AND BY MARKEDLY CLOSER
ALLIANCE COLLABORATION IN ALL AREAS OF COMMON INTEREST.

- MBFR IN 1974 BECAME THE PRIME EXAMPLE OF INTIMATE
ALLIANCE CONSULTATION AND HARMONIOUS COORDINATION ON
THIS SUBJECT WHICH IS VITAL TO THE MAINTENANCE OF
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COLLECTIVE SECURITY. THE ALLIES--INCLUDING FRANCE,
THE MUTE, NOTE-TAKING ONLOOKER--FOUND THE PROCEDURE
FOR NAC APPROVAL OF GUIDANCE TO ALLIED NEGOTIATORS
IN VIENNA ON MBFR GOALS, TACTICAL POLICY AND STRATEGY
WORTHWHILE AND FAR LESS CUMBERSOME THAN MANY HAD FEARED;
AND THEY PLACED THEIR FAITH IN ITS CONTINUING EFFICACY. THE US
STRENGTHENED ITS LEADERSHIP ROLE IN MBFR. IN FACT THE
US INITIATED EVERY MAJOR PROPOSAL FOR NEW GUIDANCE
TO ALLIED NEGOTIATORS. THE ALLIES LOOKED TO THE US
FOR LEADERSHIP; BUT THEY ALSO INSISTED ON
THOROUGH CONSIDERATION AND CAREFUL ANALYSIS OF EACH US
PROPOSAL AS IT AFFECTED THEIR INDIVIDUAL POLITICAL AND MILITARY
INTERESTS. HONEST, IN-DEPTH CONSULTATIONS AND EFFECTIVE
COORDINATION IN BOTH BRUSSELS AND VIENNA DISPELLED ANY VAGUE,
LINGERING SUSPICION THAT MBFR WAS A US-SOVIET SHOW. AT THE SAME
TIME THE OTHER ALLIES BEGAN BETTER TO UNDERSTAND THE IMPORTANCE
OF THE US-SOVIET RELATIONSHIP TO THE EVENTUAL SUCCESS OF MBFR.

-- IMPROVED ALLIANCE CONSULTATION:

1974 SAW NOTEWORTHY EXPANSION IN THE DEPTH, SCALE AND
INTENSITY OF CONSULTATIONS AMONG THE FIFTEEN ALLIES. THIS
RESULTED FROM A SERIES OF US INITIATIVES AS WELL AS FROM
A GROWING SENSE OF SHARED RISK. HIGHLIGHTS WERE:

- THE COUNCIL MEETING ATTENDED BY HEADS OF GOVERNMENT AT MID-YEAR; SECRETARY KISSINGER'S PERSONAL EFFORTS TO KEEP THE ALLIES CURRENTLY INFORMED OF THE NEGOTIATIONS IN WHICH HE WAS PERSONALLY ENGAGED; AND THE VISIT OF CANADIAN PRIME MINISTER TRUDEAU IN THE FALL.

- REINFORCED NAC CONSULTATIONS WITH POLITICAL DIRECTORS AS WELL AS REINFORCED MEETINGS ON SALT, CSCE AND THE MIDDLE EAST WERE ALSO HIGHLY USEFUL.

- THE NEW FORMAT FOR THE DECEMBER NAC MINISTERIAL PERMITTED FRANKER, FULLER, UNREHEARSED EXCHANGES AMONG FOREIGN MINISTERS IN RESTRICTED SESSIONS.

- REGULAR EXCHANGES OF INFORMATION IN THE POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC COMMITTEES, THE EXPANDED CIRCULATION OF
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INTELLIGENCE IN A VARIETY OF NATO CHANNELS, AS WELL AS THE MEETINGS OF THE REGIONAL, UN AND DISARMAMENT EXPERTS EXTENDED WELL BEYOND THE RANGE OF SUBJECTS USUALLY COVERED.

-- OVERTHROW OF DICTATORSHIPS IN PORTUGAL AND GREECE:

- THE APRIL 20 COUP THAT OVERTHREW THE CAETANO GOVERNMENT ENDED 50 YEARS OF AUTHORITARIAN RULE IN PORTUGAL. THIS EVENT, AND LISBON'S SUBSEQUENT DECISION TO DIVEST PORTUGAL OF ITS AFRICAN COLONIES, RELIEVED THE ALLIES OF A POLITICAL BURDEN THAT HAD LONG VEXED THEIR FOREIGN RELATIONS AND EMBARRASSED THEM IN DEALINGS WITH THEIR OWN PARLIAMENTS. THEIR INITIAL REACTION--ALMOST IN UNISON--WAS ONE OF RELIEF.

- THE GREEK REGIME'S BUMBLING ATTEMPT TO SEIZE POWER ON CYPRUS AND THE SWIFT, BLUNT TURKISH REACTION UNSEATED THE ATHENS DICTATORSHIP, ENDING SEVEN YEARS OF ALLIED DISCOMFORT WITH UNDEMOCRATIC RULE IN GREECE. THE RETURN OF CARAMANLIS AND HIS OVERWHELMING ELECTION VICTORY IN NOVEMBER HAVE FOSTERED MUCH ALLIED SYMPATHY FOR GREECE.

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NEA-06 EB-03 IO-03 /065 W

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R 051330Z FEB 75

FM USMISSION NATO

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 9938

SECDEF WASHDC

INFO ALL NATO CAPITALS 4960

AMEMBASSY DUBLIN

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AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM

USMISSION EC BRUSSELS

USMISSION GENEVA

USDEL MBFR VIENNA

USNMR SHAPE

USCINCEUR

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11 FRANCE:

- DURING THE YEAR, FRANCE'S PARTICIPATION IN THE ALLIANCE PROGRESSED FROM THE SHARP CONFRONTATIONS BETWEEN JOBERT AN SECRETARY KISSINGER, THROUGH FRENCH ACCESSION TO THE ATLANTIC DECLARATION AND PARTICIPATION IN THE NATO SUMMIT, TO EVEN BRIGHTER SIGNS OF COOPERATION AT YEAR'S END.

- MOREOVER, THESE PROMISING SIGNS REMAINED ASCENDANT DESPITE THE KEEN AND SOMETIMES UNGENTLEMANLY US-FRENCH COMMERCIAL COMPETITION OVER A REPLACEMENT AIRCRAFT FOR THE F-104.

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- THE CURRENT FRENCH MOOD TO PARTICIPATE CONSTRUCTIVELY AND MORE ACTIVELY IN ALLIANCE AFFAIRS CERTAINLY DOES NOT HERALD FRENCH REINTEGRATION INTO NATO'S MILITARY STRUCTURE. HOWEVER IT DOES APPEAR TO REFLECT GREATER REALISM AND RECEPTIVITY ON THE PART OF THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT UNDER GISCARD.

- SIMILARLY, AS DEBATE AMONG PARLIAMENTARIANS IN THE ASSEMBLY OF WESTERN EUROPEAN UNION CLEARLY DEMONSTRATED AT YEAR'S END, EUROPE'S SOMETIME FASCINATION WITH DE GAULLE'S VISION OF THE FUTURE WAS VERY MUCH ON THE WANE. NEITHER EDITORS, NOR ACADEMICIANS, NOR PUBLIC OFFICE-HOLDERS SPOKE ANY MORE OF A EUROPE MILITARILY, POLITICALLY AND ECONOMICALLY INDEPENDENT

OF THE UNITED STATES.THERE WERE EVEN SOME WHO SAID
THAT THE VISION OF A DIRECTORATE AND THE DREAM OF A
PENTAGONAL WORLD WERE INTERRED WITH THE GENERAL AT
COLOMBEY-LES-DEUX-EGLEES.

-- FROM JACKSON-NUNN TO THE NUNN AMENDMENT:

- THE BELATED US-FRG BILATERAL OFFSET AGREEMENT AND HELP
BY THE OTHER ALLIES IN IDENTIFYING THEIR MILITARY PROCUREMENT
PURCHASES IN THE US ENABLED WASHINGTON TO SATISFY TO
THE FULL THE TERMS OF THE JACKSON-NUNN AMENDMENT. THIS
RESULT GAVE THE ALLIES A WARM GLOW OF ACHIEVEMENT AS
WELL AS A SENSE OF RELIEF BECAUSE THEY JUDGED
THAT THERE HAD BEEN A LESSENING OF CONGRESSIONAL
PRESSURE FOR US FORCE REDUCTIONS. IT THEN BECAME POSSIBLE
FOR THE ALLIANCE TO SHIFT ATTENTION TO THE MORE PALATABLE
AND CONSTRUCTIVE REQUIREMENTS OF THE NUNN AMENDMENT WHICH
CAN ACTUALLY IMPROVE THE CONCENTIONAL DEFENSE POSTURE.

- THE ALLIES GREETED WITH ENTHUSIASM US PLANS IN
CONFORMITY WITH THE NUNN AMENDMENT TO TRANSFORM
"TAIL" INTO "TEETH" AND DEPLOY TWO ADDITIONAL COMBAT
BRIGADES TO GERMANY. THEY HAVE LONG ESPOUSED THE NEED
FOR WEAPONS STANDARDIZATION IN NATO; BUT, BEING PRUDENT AND
FEELING A DEEP CONCERN ABOUT THEIR OWN DOMESTIC ARMAMENTS
INDUSTRIES, THEY HAVE PREFERRED TO WAIT UNTIL WASHINGTON MANIFESTED
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ITS THINKING. HOWEVER, OUR ALLIES REACTED VISCERALLY
AND WITH GREAT CAUTION TO THE CALL FOR A REEXAMINATION
OF OUR TACTICAL NUCLEAR POSTURE IN EUROPE.

-- DEFENSE ISSUES:

- THE US UNLEASHED A MAJOR EFFORT AT EVERY LEVEL TO
CONVINCE THE ALLIES THAT, WORKING TOGETHER, WE COULD
MAKE THE MOST OF OUR TOTAL AND COMBINED DEFENSE RESOURCES
THROUGH COOPERATION AND RATIONALIZATION ON AN INTERNATIONAL
SCALE. THAT EFFORT ACHIEVED A MEASURE OF SUCCESS, FOR
CERTAIN OF THE ALLIED GOVERNMENTS DID BEGIN TO DEMONSTRATE
A GENUINE INTEREST IN COOPERATIVE PROGRAMS DESIGNED TO
MEET THESE GOALS.

- DOGGED US INSISTENCE THAT THE ALLIES SHOULDER MORE
EQUITABLY THE BURDEN OF COMMON-FUNDED PROGRAMS PRODUCED
A MODEST REDUCTION IN THE US SHARE OF EXPENDITURES FOR
NATO INFRASTRUCTURE AND FOR THE CENTRAL EUROPEAN PIPELINE.

- SECRETARY OF DEFENSE SCHLESINGER CONVINCED OUR ALLIES
IN THE NUCLEAR PLANNING GROUP THAT DISCRIMINATING
NUCLEAR TARGETING OPTIONS WILL STRENGTHEN DETERRENCE.

- ALLIED ACCEPTANCE OF THE NEED FOR A NEW TARGETING
DOCTRINE WAS NO DOUBT PARTLY RESPONSIBLE FOR THE SUPPORT
WHICH THE US GAINED FOR A NEW EMPHASIS
ON IMPROVEMENT OF CONVENTIONAL FORCES.

- IN THE DEFENSE PLANNING COMMITTEE, SECRETARY SCHLESINGER
POINTED OUT TO HIS FELLOW DEFENSE MINISTERS THAT THE
SOVIET AND OTHER WARSAW PACT MILITARY FORCES HAVE
WEAKNESSES AS WELL AS STRENGTHS IN CONVENTIONAL
CAPABILITY; AND THE ALLIES HAVE NOW AGREED TO PLACE
NEW EMPHASIS ON MODERNIZING AND IMPROVING THEIR
CONVENTIONAL FORCES AT AN ADEQUATE LEVEL.

- ADDITIONALLY, THE US FOCUSED ALLIED EFFORTS ON
DETERMINING FIRST PRIORITY FORCE GOALS WHICH CONSTITUTED
A REASONABLE CHALLENGE FOR NATIONS.

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-ALLIES AGREED TO CONCENTRATE ON ACHIEVING GREATER
COOPERATION IN SUCH AREAS AS STANDARDIZATION OF
WEAPON SYSTEMS, RATIONALIZATION OF TRAINING, COMMUNICATIONS,
AND LOGISTICS SUPPORT.

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NEA-06 EB-03 IO-03 /065 W

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R 051330Z FEB 75

FM USMISSION NATO

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SECDEF WASHDC

INFO ALL NATO CAPITALS 4961

AMEMBASSY DUBLIN

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AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM

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USMISSION GENEVA

USDEL MBFR VIENNA

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LIMDIS

--CCMS:

IN TUNE WITH THE TIMES, THE ALLIANCE'S COMMITTEE ON THE CHALLENGE OF MODERN SOCIETY (CCMS) GAVE SIGNIFICANTLY GREATER IMPETUS TO THOSE ALLIED PROJECTS AIMED AT CONSERVING THE WORLD'S DIMINISHING ENERGY RESOURCES. IT SUCCESSFULLY CONCLUDED TWO PILOT STUDIES--BOTH US LED-- DEALING WITH AIR POLLUTION AND ROAD SAFETY. THESE ARE TWO OF THE EARLIEST AND MOST AMBITIOUS ALLIED UNDERTAKINGS IN CCMS. MOREOVER, THESE INITIATIVES HAVE YIELDED RESULTS, FOR THEY SET IN MOTION SIGNIFICANT FOLLOW-ON ACTIVITIES: INTENSIVE INTERNATIONAL WORK ON PRODUCING AUTOMOBILE ENGINES THAT ARE CLEANER AND MORE SECRET

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ECONOMICAL, AND HAVE ESTABLISHED A COORDINATED AND SYSTEMATIC PROGRAM TO REDUCE TRAFFIC FATALITIES.

4. 1974 - THE DEBIT SIDE OF THE LEDGER.

-- ECONOMIC DETERIORATION:

- THE SINGLE FACTOR WEIGHING MOST HEAVILY ON ALLIED ACTIVITIES DURING 1974 WAS INFLATION AND THE NEED TO COMPENSATE FOR IT MANY ALLIES INCREASED THEIR BUDGETARY CONTRIBUTIONS TO DEFENSE; BUT WAGE AND PRICE INCREASES SERVED TO NULLIFY THEM.

- INFLATION, ECONOMIC STAGNATION AND, AT YEARS END, GROWING UNEMPLOYMENT ENGENDERED PUBLIC AND PARLIAMENTARY PRESSURES TO SLASH DEFENSE SPENDING AND IN SOME INSTANCES TO DIVERT DEFENSE ALLOCATED MONIES TO COPE WITH MOUNTING DOMESTIC SOCIAL NEEDS.

-- MILITARY CUTBACKS:

- CRIPPLING ECONOMIC PRESSURES FORCED THE UK AND ITALY TO INITIATE MEASURES THAT SEEM CERTAIN TO RESULT IN MAJOR, PERMANENT MILITARY RETRENCHMENTS. DUTCH PLANS TO FOLLOW MUCH THE SAME ROUTE WERE MODIFIED--AND THE PLANNED REDUCTIONS WERE REDUCED--BUT ONLY IN THE FACE OF HEAVY COUNTERPRESSURE FROM THE ALLIES.

- HMG'S DEFENSE DECISION HAVE AN HISTORIC SIGNIFICANCE. THEY MARK THE END OF BRITAIN'S TRADITIONAL ROLE AS A EUROPEAN REGIONAL MILITARY POWER WHICH COULD EMPLOY HIGHLY MOBILE SEA AND AIRBORNE FORCES TO INFLUENCE THE COURSE OF EVENTS. WHILE THE UK WILL CONTINUE ITS

SUBSTANTIAL AND WELCOME FORCE COMMITMENT TO NATO'S CENTRAL REGION, ITS DEPLOYMENTS IN THE MEDITERRANEAN AND EAST OF SUEZ WILL SOON BECOME INCONSEQUENTIAL.

-- THE SOUTHERN FLANK:

NATO'S SOUTHERN FLANK WITHERED DURING 1974:

- THERE WERE HIGH HOPES EVERYWHERE FOR THE REGIME WHICH
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REPLACED CAETANO IN PORTUGAL LAST APRIL; BUT IT FIRST TILTED AND HAS NOW BEGUN TO SLIDE STEADILY TOWARD THE LEFT, THROWING DOUBT ON THE STRENGTH OF PORTUGAL'S COMMITMENT TO NATO. THIS STEADY LEFTWARD DRIFT- AND THE PRESENCE OF AN AVOWED COMMUNIST IN THE CABINET--FORCED THE ALLIES TO EXCLUDE PORTUGAL FROM PARTICIPATION IN ACTIVITIES OF THE NPG; AND THE US FACED RISK TO ITS UNLIMITED ACCESS TO ITS BASE IN THE AZORES.

- FRUSTRATED BY THEIR INABILITY TO NEGOTIATE WITH ANKARA OR TO BUDGE THE TURKISH MILITARY FROM THEIR POSITIONS IN CYPRUS, THE GREEKS WITHDREW THEIR ARMED FORCES FROM NATO'S INTEGRATED MILITARY STRUCTURE; AND THE GOG ANNOUNCED ITS DECISION TO RE-EVALUATE US BASE RIGHTS, RETAINING ONLY THOSE THAT IN ITS VIEW CONTRIBUTE TO GREEK NATIONAL INTERESTS.

- MEANWHILE THE US CONGRESS HAS LEGISLATED THE CESSATION OF MILITARY AID TO TURKEY EFFECTIVE FEBRUARY 5, 1975, UNLESS THERE IS SIGNIFICANT PROGRESS TOWARD SOLVING THE CYPRUS PROBLEM. SINCE TURKEY'S DEFENSE EFFORT IS NEARLY TOTALLY DEPENDENT ON EXTERNAL ARMS ASSISTANCE, NATO'S CONVENTIONAL DEFENSIVE STRENGTH IN THE EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN WILL EBB RAPIDLY, AND THE ALLIES ARE WORRIED.

- THE DETERIORATING ECONOMY OF ITALY WHICH BROUGHT THE COUNTRY TO NEAR BANKRUPTCY IN 1974 HAS AGGRAVATED OLD POLITICAL PROBLEMS, CREATED NEW ONES, AND SPAWNED SOCIAL UNREST ON A SCALE THAT HAS CAUSED SOME TO QUESTION THE FUTURE STABILITY OF THE COUNTRY AND ITS RELIABILITY AND VALUE AS AN ALLY.

1975 - PROSPECTS

5. 1975 - PROBLEMS AND OPPORTUNITIES.

-- THE NEW YEAR OPENS WITH MOUNTING ALLIED CONCERN ABOUT THE ECONOMIC SITUATION, ABOUT ITS IMPACT ON WESTERN DEFENSE EFFORTS, AND ABOUT SUCH OTHER "GUT" ISSUES AS PARADOXICALLY HIGH RATES OF INFLATION WITH GROWING UNEMPLOYMENT. THE FIVE-FOLD JUMP IN OIL PRICES AND PARALLEL INCREASES IN THE PRICE OF OTHER ENERGY SOURCES AND THE PAINFUL AWARENESS

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THAT WAR COULD AGAIN ERUPT IN THE MIDDLE EAST HAVE FURTHER
HEIGHTENED THEIR ANXIETY.

-- THE SHEER MAGNITUDE OF THE MULTINATIONAL ECONOMIC/ENERGY
PROBLEMS CONFRONTING THE ALLIES HAS FORCED THEM TO LOOK
MORE CLOSELY AT JOINT EFFORTS TO SOLVE THEM. A COLLECTIVE
ATTEMPT TO COPE WITH THESE FORCES, WHICH HAVE STRUCK MOST
SAVAGELY AT THE UK, ITALY AND DENMARK, WOULD HAVE BEEN
UNTHINKABLE IN THE DAYS OF CHARLES DE GAULLE; BUT THE
MEETING AT MARTINIQUE WITH GISCARD MOVED JUST SUCH A
COLLECTIVIST APPROACH A GOOD DEAL CLOSER TO REALITY.
INDEED, MOST OF THE ALLIES ARE ON THE POINT OF ACCEPTING
THE THESIS THAT NATIONAL SECURITY AND ECONOMICS ARE SO
CLOSELY INTERTWINED THAT ONLY THROUGH COLLABORATION RESULTING
FROM CLOSE CONSULTATIONS CAN THE WEST EFFECTIVELY COPE WITH
THIS COMPLEX OF PROBLEMS.

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NEA-06 EB-03 IO-03 /065 W

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R 051330Z FEB 75

FM USMISSION NATO

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 9940

SECDEF WASHDC

INFO ALL NATO CAPITALS 4962

AMEMBASSY DUBLIN

AMEMBASSY MADRID

AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM

USMISSION EC BRUSSELS

USMISSION GENEVA

USDEL MBFR VIENNA

USNMR SHAPE

USCINCEUR

USLOSACLANT

USDOCOSOUTH

USDEL SALT TWO GENEVA

S E C R E T SECTION 5 OF 7 USNATO 0619

LIMDIS

-- THE PESSIMISTIC PORTENTS WITH WHICH 1975 OPENED CALL FOR STEADY US LEADERSHIP IF ALLIANCE SECURITY IN ITS BROADEST SENSE IS TO BE MAINTAINED. FOR THE EVENTS OF 1974 DEMONSTRATED ONCE AGAIN TO THINKING EUROPEANS THAT, WHATEVER ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL PROBLEMS AFFLICT THE US., IT IS STILL THE ONLY ALLY WITH THE ECONOMIC STRENGTH AND THE POLITICAL WILL THAT ARE ESSENTIAL FOR LEADERSHIP OF THE ALLIANCE. WHILE THE TASK OF US LEADERSHIP BECOMES MORE DIFFICULT AS PROBLEMS MOUNT, OUR ABDICATION OF THAT TASK MIGHT WELL TOUCH OFF AN IRREPARABLE DECLINE FOR THE WEST.

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6. PROBLEMS: 1975 AND BEYOND.

THE ALLIANCE FACES A BROAD ARRAY OF PROBLEMS IN 1975:

-- POLITICAL:

WHILE OVER-ALL ALLIANCE POLITICAL SOLIDARITY IS CURRENTLY HEALTHY, IT IS SUSCEPTIBLE TO INFECTION FROM A VARIETY OF SOURCES:

- SOVIET REJECTION, EVEN IF ONLY TEMPORARY, OF A POSTURE FAVORABLE TO DETENTE COULD RE-INTRODUCE FRICTIONS STEMMING FROM DIFFERING DETENTE GOALS AND PERCEPTIONS IN THE VARIOUS CAPITALS.

- GROWING ECONOMIC PRESSURES--FROM WHICH THE USSR AND MOST WARSAW PACT STATES HAVE THUS FAR INSULATED THEMSELVES-- COULD FRACTURE ALLIANCE UNITY. NATO'S WEAKENED SOUTHERN FLANK CAN NOW OFFER LITTLE RESISTANCE; AND THE COMING TO POWER OF AN AUTHORITARIAN LEFTIST OR RIGHTIST REGIME IN THAT AREA COULD IMPOSE AN INTOLERABLE STRAIN ON INTER-ALLIED RELATIONS.

- A DETERIORATION OF THE MIDDLE EAST SITUATION OR ANOTHER GREEK/TURKISH MILITARY CONFRONTATION OVER CYPRUS COULD SERIOUSLY DIVIDE KEY ALLIES AND FURTHER WEAKEN NATO'S FLABBY SOUTHEASTERN FLANK. A RENEWAL OF MIDDLE EAST HOSTILITIES WOULD AGAIN PUT TO THE TEST WESTERN COOPERATION IN DEALING WITH THE MIDDLE EAST OIL-PRODUCING STATES.

- DETERIORATION COULD ALSO OCCUR IN OTHER AREAS ALONG NATO'S SOUTHERN FLANK SHOULD THE PORTUGUESE GOVERNMENT MOVE FURTHER TO THE LEFT, AGAIN BECOME AUTHORITARIAN, OR JUST BECOME GENEALLY LESS STABLE. SPAIN ALSO FACES-- PERHAPS IN THE COMING YEAR--THE DELICATE PROBLEM OF FRANCO'S SUCCESSION WHICH COULD EITHER LEAD SPAIN TOWARD

THE FOLD OF MODERN, REPRESENTATIVE EUROPEAN GOVERNMENTS,
OR INTO INSTABILITY, OR TO AN AUTARTIC, CHAUVINISTIC
REGIME HOSTILE TO ITS NEIGHBORS, TO THE EC-9, AND TO
NATO. SIMILARLY, YUGOSLAVIA WITH ITS BALKAN HERITAGE
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COULD BECOME A MAJOR CONCERN SHOULD TITO PASS FROM THE
SCENE. WITH THE RESIDUAL STRENGTH OF ITS INEFFICIENT
POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS ALREADY SAPPED BY A FLOUNDERING
ECONOMY, ITALY TOO FACES A PERIOD OF UNCERTAINTY
AND THE GROWING RISK OF OVERT COMMUNIST PARTICIPATION
IN THE GOVERNING PROCESS.

DEFENSE:

THE NEXT TWELVE MONTHS PROMISE NATO AND THE ALLIED GOVERNMENTS
NO RELIEF FROM THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE ENERGY CRISIS, FROM
SAGGING ECONOMIES, STRAITENED GOVERNMENT REVENUES AND RISING
UNEMPLOYMENT. ECONOMIC FACTORS ALONE, QUITE APART FROM THE
POLITICS OF DETENTE, MAY EVEN MAKE IT DIFFICULT TO MAINTAIN
CURRENT OVERALL DEFENSE SPENDING LEVELS. THIS HAS ALREADY
BEEN DEMONSTRATED IN THE UK DEFENSE REVIEW, THE "RIPPLE
EFFECT" OF WHICH MIGHT WELL EXTEND TO OTHER ALLIED DEFENSE
EFFORTS. ONE MUST THEREFORE BE READY TO GUARD AGAINST
ALLIED BACKSLIDING FROM THE SUBSTANTIAL AND REAL SUPPORT
THE US HAS SO FAR RECEIVED ON THE IMPROVEMENT OF ALLIED
CONVENTIONAL FORCES.

- AS A FURTHER AND LONGER TERM EFFECT OF BRITAIN'S
ACTION, THE UK WILL VERY SOON NO LONGER BE ABLE TO
ACT OR BEHAVE LIKE A REGIONAL POWER WITH FORCES
DEPLOYED ON THE CONTINENT AS WELL AS IN THE MEDITERRANEAN
AND MIDDLE EAST. THUS, SOONER RATHER THAN LATER, THE
BRITISH WILL FIND IT NECESSARY TO ABANDON THEIR LONG-VALUED
ROLE AS AN HONEST BROKER AND STABILIZINGFACTOR IN THE
EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN. THIS WILL DIMINISH THE POLITICAL
AND PHYSICAL SUPPORT WHICH A TRADITIONAL ALLY HAS
OFFERED THE US AND OTHER ALLIES IN A VOLATILE AND
DANGEROUS AREA. IT MAY IN TIME RAISE THE QUESTION
WHETHER THE US CAN, WISHES, OR IS WILLING TO SHOULDER
THE BURDEN WHICH BRITAIN IS NOW LAYING DOWN.

7. OPPORTUNITIES AND CHALLENGES.

THE PROBLEMS WEIGHING ON THE ALLIANCE AS IT HEADS INTO ITS
SECOND QUARTER CENTURY ARE THE SUM OF THE AFFLICTIONS FROM WHICH
THE ALLIED GOVERNMENTS ARE SUFFERING. THEY ARE MANY AND THEY ARE
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READILY DISCERNIBLE. THE OPPORTUNITIES FOR PROGRESS ARE NOT SO

OBVIOUS. BUT PROGRESS MIGHT BE EASIER THAN HERETOFORE GIVEN A
GREATER PUBLIC AWARENESS THAT WESTERN SOCIETIES, AND THE ALLIANCE
WHICH BINDS MANY OF THEM, FACE CHALLENGES WHICH WILL NOT PERMIT A
LACK OF RESOLVE, SOLIDARITY OR LEADERSHIP.

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ACTION EUR-08

INFO OCT-01 SS-14 ISO-00 SP-02 PM-03 INR-05 NSC-05 NSCE-00

CIAE-00 ACDA-10 SAM-01 SAJ-01 TRSE-00 L-01 PRS-01 H-01

NEA-06 EB-03 IO-03 /065 W

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R 051330Z FEB 75

FM USMISSION NATO

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SECDEF WASHDC

INFO ALL NATO CAPITALS 4963

AMEMBASSY DUBLIN

AMEMBASSY MADRID

AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM

USMISSION EC BRUSSELS

USMISSION GENEVA

USDEL MBFR VIENNA

USNMR SHAPE

USCINCEUR

USLOSACLANT

USDOCOSOUTH

USDEL SALT TWO GENEVA

S E C R E T SECTION 6 OF 7 USNATO 0619

LIMDIS

-- THE KEY QUESTION: HOW WILL NATO IN THE COMING YEAR ENHANCE
THE NATIONAL SECURITY OF THE UNITED STATES AND THAT OF ITS ALLIES--
AND HOW CAN THIS MISSION INSURE THAT THE US WILL BE ABLE TO
INFLUENCE ITS ALLIES BY POLITICAL PERSUASION IN NATO
SO AS TO ADVANCE AMERICAN NATIONAL INTERESTS IN WESTERN
EUROPE, IN THE EAST-WEST CONTEXT AND IN THE PROCESS TO
HARMONIZE THE NATIONAL AND REGIONAL POLICIES OF ALLIED
GOVERNMENTS WITH WASHINGTON'S GLOBAL POLICY OBJECTIVES?

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--SECURITY AND DETENTE:

- US AND WESTERN EUROPEAN INTERESTS AND OBJECTIVES
CONTINUE TO COINCIDE IN THE DEFENSE AND DETENTE AREAS.
THEY ARE THEREFORE COMPLEMENTARY AND MUTUALLY REINFORCING.

- A KEY OBJECTIVE OF THE ALLIANCE IS THE MAINTENANCE OF A
COLLECTIVE DEFENSE POSTURE WHICH--DESPITE ECONOMIC
DIFFICULTIES--WILL PROVIDE BOTH A CREDIBLE DETERRENT
TO WAR AND A STALWART MILITARY CAPABILITY SHOULD DETERRENCE
FAIL.

- THE DEFENSE POSTURE OF THE ALLIANCE ALSO SERVES THE
DETENTE GOALS OF THE ALLIES FOR WITHOUT ADEQUATE VISIBLE
WESTERN MILITARY STRENGTH, EASTERN INCENTIVES TO NEGOTIATE
SERIOUSLY WILL EVAPORATE.

-- IN THE PRUDENT QUEST FOR DETENTE OVER THE COMING YEAR, THE
ALLIES SHOULD BE ABLE TO CONTINUE TO MAKE PROGRESS:

- CSCE. THE RECENT, MORE FAVORABLE NEGOTIATING PACE AT
GENEVA SUGGESTS THAT IT MIGHT BE POSSIBLE TO CONCLUDE
CSCE ON GROUNDS ACCEPTABLE TO THE WEST. WHILE THORNY
PROBLEMS REMAIN, CONTINUED ALLIED SOLIDARITY AND
POSSIBLE SOVIET INTEREST IN AN EARLY, HIGH-LEVEL
CONCLUSION COULD CONVERGE TO BRING THE CONFERENCE
TO A CLOSE BEFORE AUTUMN.

- MBFR. THE ALLIES, IN PART BECAUSE OF ECONOMIC
PRESSURES, HOPE THAT MBFR WILL BEGIN TO MOVE TOWARD
THE REDUCTION OF FORCES OBJECTIVE DURING THE CURRENT
YEAR. OUR ALLIES ARE UNCERTAIN, HOWEVER, ABOUT WHAT THEY
CAN OR SHOULD DO TO MOVE THE NEGOTIATIONS FORWARD. THEY
CONTINUE TO LOOK TO THE US FOR LEADERSHIP IN PROPOSING
CHANGES IN THE ALLIED POSITION; BUT THEY WILL CONTINUE TO
INSIST ON THE NEED FOR THOROUGH EXAMINATION AND ANALYSIS
OF ANY NEW US INITIATIVES. THE ALLIES RECOGNIZE THE
POTENTIAL OF THE NUCLEAR OPTION TO HELP MOVE THE NEGOTIATION
FORWARD, AND MOST WOULD WELCOME ITS INTRODUCTION
AFTER THOROUGH STUDY.

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- SALT. THE VLADIVOSTOK SUMMIT AGREEMENTS LAID SOLID
FOUNDATIONS FOR A FURTHER UNDERSTANDING TO REPLACE THE
INTERIM AGREEMENT OF 1972. CURRENT SIGNS SEEM TO INDICATE
THAT POSSIBLE CHANGES IN MOSCOW'S POLITICAL DIRECTION WILL
NOT PROMPT THE SOVIETS TO CALL INTO QUESTION SUCH NATO-
IMPORTANT FEATURES OF THE VLADIVOSTOK ACCORDS AS THE
EXCLUSION FROM SALT OF FORWARD-BASED SYSTEMS (FB).

-- IN THE DEFENSE AREA, THE FOLLOWING OPPORTUNITIES AND CHALLENGES

MERIT CLOSE ATTENTION:

- COOPERATIVE DEFENSE PROGRAMS. THE UNITED STATES IN THE COMING YEAR WILL PRESS AHEAD WITH MODERNIZATION OF ITS WEAPONS AND FORCES IN ORDER TO KEEP PACE WITH THE WARSAW PACT. THE 1975 ECONOMIC CLIMATE, HOWEVER, SEEMS CERTAIN TO FORCE COMPROMISES IN THE ACQUISITION OF MORE SOPHISTICATED WEAPONS SYSTEMS FOR US FORCES. IT IS THEREFORE ALREADY CLEAR: 1) THAT THE US MUST CONCEIVE, FOSTER AND HONESTLY SUPPORT COOPERATIVE DEFENSE PROGRAMS INVOLVING ITSELF AND THE ALLIES; AND 2) THAT IT MUST ENCOURAGE AND GUIDE SUCH PROGRAMS AMONG THE ALLIES THEMSELVES. SUCH EMPHASIS IS NECESSARY IF ALLIED GOVERNMENTS ARE TO SECURE MAXIMUM DEFENSE CAPABILITY FROM STRAITENED BUDGETS BY STANDARDIZING WEAPONRY AND ACHIEVING GREATER INTEROPERABILITY OF SYSTEMS. THE UNITED STATES MUST--AS IN OTHER ALLIANCE ENDEAVORS--SHOW LEADERSHIP BY INDUCING, CAJOLING, PERSUADING AND PRESSING THE EUROGROUP MEMBERS TO COLLABORATE WITH IT IN CONSORTIUM OR SIMILAR ARRANGEMENTS TRENDING TOWARD STANDARDIZATION, THEREBY REDUCING DEFENSE DUPLICATION AND WASTE.

- BURDENSARING.

IN RECENT YEARS THE UNITED STATES HAS SUCCEEDED IN SHIFTING SOME OF THE ALLIANCE DEFENSE BURDEN FROM ITSELF TO ITS PROSPERING EUROPEAN ALLIES. THIS PROCESS CAN AND SHOULD CONTINUE BUT WITH PRUDENCE, FOR THERE NOW EXISTS A CLEAR AND PRESENT DANGER OF PRECIPITATING POLITICAL RUPTURES AMONG THE ALLIES AT A TIME WHEN ADVERSE ECONOMIC PRESSURE IS WEIGHING
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HEAVILY ON MANY OF THEM.

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ACTION EUR-08

INFO OCT-01 SS-14 ISO-00 SP-02 PM-03 INR-05 NSC-05 NSCE-00

CIAE-00 ACDA-10 SAM-01 SAJ-01 TRSE-00 L-01 PRS-01 H-01

NEA-06 EB-03 /062 W

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R 051330Z FEB 75

FM USMISSION NATO

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 9942
SECDEF WASHDC
INFO ALL NATO CAPITALS 4964
AMEMBASSY DUBLIN
AMEMBASSY MADRID
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM
USMISSION EC BRUSSELS
USMISSION GENEVA
USDEL MBFR VIENNA
USNMR SHAPE
USCINCEUR
USLOSACLANT
USDOCOSOUTH
USDEL SALT TWO GENEVA

S E C R E T SECTION 7 OF 7 USNATO 0619

LIMDIS

- NUCLEAR WEAPONS. THE US THEATER NUCLEAR STOCKPILE IN EUROPE BEARS LITTLE RELATION TO WHAT A RATIONAL ASSESSMENT OF AN ALLIANCE POSTURE MIGHT CALL FOR. IT IS POLITICALLY AND MILITARILY IMPORTANT THAT THE STOCKPILE BE MODERNIZED. IT IS EQUALLY IMPORTANT TO DO SO IN A WAY THAT RESPONDS TO THE BASIC AND LONG- FELT POLITICAL CONCERNS OF OUR ALLIES. IN SUM, IT IS INCUMBENT UPON THE US TO PERSUADE THE ALLIES--THEIR GOVERNMENTS, THEIR PARLIAMENTS AND THEIR PUBLICS-- THAT THE TACTICAL NUCLEAR LEG OF NATO'S DETERRENT
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TRIAD REMAINS FULLY EFFECTIVE.

- NATO'S SOUTHERN FLANK. NATO'S SOUTHERN FLANK POSES REAL CHALLENGES IN 1975; THE OPPORTUNITIES HAVE YET TO MANIFEST THEMSELVES. CUMULATIVE INTERACTION OF RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN GREECE, TURKEY, ITALY, SPAIN AND PORTUGAL, WHEN ADDED TO THE VERY SUBSTANTIAL DRAWDOWNS THAT THE UK IS PLANNING IN THE SOUTHERN REGION IN THE WAKE OF ITS LANDMARK DEFENSE REVIEW, ALL SUGGEST THE NEED FOR A STEELY-EYED BASIC REVIEW OF THE US DEFENSE POSTURE IN THE MEDITERRANEAN.

-- POLITICS AND ECONOMICS:

EUROPE'S DEPENDENCE ON US PROTECTION FOR ITS MILITARY SECURITY, ECONOMIC SELF-CONFIDENCE AND POLITICAL INDEPENDENCE--PUBLICLY DECLARED AGAIN IN JUNE 1974 IN THE OTTAWA DECLARATION--PROVIDES THE US WITH THE BASIS FOR SEEKING CLOSE CONSULTATION WITH THE EC-9 ON FOREIGN AND ECONOMIC POLICIES WHICH EFFECT ALLIANCE SECURITY AND EAST-WEST RELATIONS. AS ALLIANCE COHESION IMPROVED LAST YEAR, SO DID OUR RELATIONSHIP WITH

THE EC-9 ON POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC CONSULTATION. THIS WELCOME TREND SHOULD CONTINUE IN 1975 GIVEN GREATER WESTERN EUROPEAN AWARENESS THAT THE POLITICAL CHALLENGES AND ECONOMIC DANGERS THEY FACE REQUIRE TRANSLANTIC COLLABORATION NOW, AND FOR THE FORESEEABLE FUTURE.

REAL OPPORTUNITIES EXIST TO STRENGTHEN THE CONSULTATIVE MACHINERY OF THE ALLIANCE AND TO EXPAND THE SUBJECT MATTER WHICH IT COVERS. ECONOMIC ISSUES AND EXTRA-NATO DEVELOPMENTS AFFECTING ALLIANCE SECURITY ARE PRIME TARGETS FOR SUCH EXPANSION. THOSE SUBJECTS SHOULD BE PURSUED BOTH IN EXISTING ALLIANCE INSTITUTIONS AS WELL AS IN NEWLY CREATED FORA SUCH AS REINFORCED COUNCIL MEETINGS ATTENDED BY POLICY-MAKING OFFICIALS FROM CAPITALS AND PERHAPS--A NEW THOUGHT-- IN REINFORCED MEETINGS OF THE DEFENSE PLANNING COMMITTEE. THE STUDY OF THE SECURITY IMPLICATIONS OF THE PRESENT WORLD ECONOMIC SITUATION--WHICH THE SECRETARY CALLED FOR AT NATO'S DECEMBER MINISTERIAL--IS A NATURAL CANDIDATE FOR JUST SUCH EXPANDED CONSULTATIONS. BRUCE

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Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: Z
Capture Date: 18 AUG 1999
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: n/a
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 05 FEB 1975
Decaption Date: 28 MAY 2004
Decaption Note: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Authority: GarlanWA
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 28 MAY 2004
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1975NATO00619
Document Source: ADS
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: n/a
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: 11652 GDS
Errors: n/a
Film Number: n/a
From: NATO
Handling Restrictions: n/a
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1975/newtext/t19750286/abbrzhzz.tel
Line Count: 994
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE
Office: n/a
Original Classification: SECRET
Original Handling Restrictions: LIMDIS
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 19
Previous Channel Indicators:
Previous Classification: SECRET
Previous Handling Restrictions: LIMDIS
Reference: n/a
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Authority: GarlanWA
Review Comment: n/a
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 31 MAR 2003
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review History: RELEASED <31 MAR 2003 by BoyleJA>; APPROVED <14 AUG 2003 by GarlanWA>
Review Markings:

Margaret P. Grafeld
Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
05 JUL 2006

Review Media Identifier:
Review Referrals: n/a
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: THE NORTH ATLANTIC ALLIANCE: RETROSPECT AND PROSPECT
TAGS: PFOR, NATO
To: STATE
SECDEF INFO ALL NATO CAPITALS
DUBLIN
MADRID
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Markings: Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 05 JUL 2006